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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is not an exhaustive treatment of the subject of top 
leases, rather, it is intended to identify certain problem areas which traditionally arise 
and point out new problems, discuss significant cases, and provide advice which may help 
avoid or deal with the problems which are discussed. Problems that may arise in 
connection with top leasing of mineral estates which are discussed, from legal theory to 
practical reality, include whether a novation was intended in a two-party top lease 
situation, the issue of clouding of title and or equitable obstruction, and their three 
cousins contractual interference, intentional breach of contract and slander of title, and
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trespass in three-party top lease situations. The problem areas associated with the rule 
against perpetuities and with extending the bottom lease (cutting off top leases) by 
pooling, production, or other operations are also discussed. Since most of these issues 
have not been directly addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court and pertinent Federal 
Courts, cases and statutes from other jurisdictions have been included for both their 
precedential value and to identify the different possibilities from the legal theories 
involved to the factual reality of the situation.
I. WHAT IS A TOP LEASE?
A.  DEFINITION
While most people in the oil business know what a top lease is (or think they do) 
the following discussion regarding the establishment of a solid definition for top leases 
will show otherwise. The mental process of formulating a definition for top leases will 
point out the basis for many of the problems surrounding them both factually and legally. 
To understand the many and varied ways that top lease problems can arise, both factually 
and legally, it is essential to address the different aspects which go into formulating a 
valid definition.
The term "top lease" has been defined in a number of ways. Probably the best 
and clearest definition of a top lease is an oil and gas lease covering a mineral estate 
that is currently under a valid, existing oil and gas lease. 1
1 Kemp, Top Leasing fo r O il and Gas: The Legal Perspective, 59 Den. L .J . 641 (1982).
2
Conversely, a "bottom lease" has been defined as an existing lease covering a
mineral interest upon which a second lease or a top lease has been granted. 2
Another definition of a top lease has been given as follows:
A ‘top lease’ is one taken by a lessee from a lessor who has 
previously given a lease on the same interest to another, 
which previous lease had not expired at the time the top 
lease was taken. 3
Note that this definition fails to recognize that the lessor in a top lease is not necessarily 
one and the same person as the lessor in the original or bottom lease. A lease executed 
by a successor in interest to the original lessor, if executed while the bottom lease was 
still in force and effect, would also constitute a top lease. It also fails to recognize that 
the lessee in a top lease is not necessarily a different person or entity from the lessee in 
the bottom lease. Another definition which has been given for a top lease emphasizes 
the fact that the lessee in a top lease may be either the present lessee under the bottom 
lease or some third party:
A ‘top lease’ is a lease that is acquired by either a third- 
party or the present lessee during the term of a valid and 
effective lease for the purpose of having a new lease at the 
termination of the present lease. 4
This definition also points out the basic reason why the current lessee or a third party 
would acquire a top lease - to put in place a lease which will be effective upon the
2 Ernest, Top Leasing - Legality v. Morality, 26 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 957 (1980).
3 Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D . Okla. 1976).
4 Bledsoe, Conveyancing of Oil and Gas Interests, 32nd Oil & Gas Inst. 83, 95 (Matthew Bender 1981).
3
termination of the current lease. Whether a particular top lease achieves this goal will 
be discussed later in more detail.
Other definitions of top leases attempt to define the nature of the legal interest 
created by the top lease. The description of a top lease as "a partial alienation of a 
possibility of reverter" refers to the fact that an oil and gas lease is, in many producing 
jurisdictions and arguably in Arkansas, 5 considered the grant of a determinable fee (a 
real property interest). The interest remaining in the lessor after the grant of an oil and 
gas lease would therefore be a possibility of reverter. When a top lease is granted it 
operates as a partial alienation (sale) of that possibility of reverter. 6
B. HISTORY
The practice of top leasing has been a controversial subject in the oil and gas 
industry for many years. The legal issues surrounding top leasing have been the subject 
of reported cases for more than fifty years. The controversy regarding top leasing has 
concerned not only its legality, but also its morality. In 1960, a federal circuit court went 
so far as to state that "top leasing has the same invidious characteristics as claim 
jumping." 7 This analogy appears appropriate in certain circumstances when viewed in 
connection with some of the situations which follow.
4
5 Wright, The Arkansas Law; Oil and Gas, 9 UALR Law Journal 223, 224 (1987), citing Hillard 
v. Stephens, 637 S.W. 2d 581 (Ark. 1982); Saulsberry  v. Siegel, 252 S.W. 2d 834, 835 (Ark. 1952)
6 Brown, Effect o f Top Leases: Obstruction o f Title and Related Considerations, 30 Baylor L. 
Rev. 213, 239-240 (1978).
7 Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n. 23 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
920 (1960).
C. VALIDITY OF TOP LEASES IN ARKANSAS
While Arkansas has not expressly adopted the validity of top leases several of its 
neighboring states have. In Barnett v. Getty Oil Company8 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, in recognizing the validity of a top lease, stated that a top lease may be 
considered a present grant of a future interest. The Court implied by its holding that a 
top lease is a valid and subsisting oil and gas lease and that a Mineral Right and Royalty 
Transfer, which was by its terms subject to valid and subsisting oil and gas leases, was 
subject to the top lease, despite the fact that the primary term of the top lease was not 
to commence until a date in the future. Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-1 would appear to 
further support the validity of top leases (as a present grant of a future interest or a 
partial alienation of a possibility of reverter) in providing that "any interest in or claim 
to land may be conveyed... by writing signed and delivered". 9 The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana expressly acknowledged the validity of top leases10, subject to certain limita-
tions. In Mitchell v. Mesa Petroleum Company11, the Texas Supreme Court stated, "if 
properly executed the second lease, normally called a "top lease, " is a valid and effective 
lease. "12 Oklahoma has also recognized the validity of top leases. 13
5
8 Barnett v. Getty Oil Company, 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972).
9 Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-1 (1972).
10 Stacy v. Midstates Oil Corp., 36 So. 2d 714 (La. 1947).
11 Mitchell v. Mesa Petroleum Company, 594 S.W. 2d 507 (Tex. 1979).
12 Id. at 513.
13 Stoltz, Wagner & Brown, 417 F. Supp. at 556. See also Jennings v. Elliott, 97 P. 2d 67 (Okla. 1939); 
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Okla. 1926).
Arkansas’ statute is similar to that of Mississippi, which as stated above, does 
seem to accept the validity of top leases (being a present grant of a future interest). Ark. 
Statute Ann. § 18-12-102(a) (1987) states that "[a]ll lands, tenements, and hereditaments 
may be aliened and possession thereof transferred by deed without livery of seizin. " I n  
the Arkansas case Smith v. Smith14 a deed containing the provision that it did not take 
"effect until the grantor’s death" was interpreted as being a present grant of a future 
interest. This case would support the validity of top leases in that what is presently being 
granted is the future right to drill for oil, gas and other minerals.
While Arkansas has not expressly stated that a top lease is valid or defined it as 
a real property interest, several Arkansas oil and gas cases impliedly acknowledge the 
validity of top leases. 15
In E nstar Corporation the primary issue was whether Enstar’s lease should be 
cancelled because of its violation of an implied covenant to develop the leasehold for the 
production of oil and gas. Crystal Oil had acquired a lease (top lease) on land that 
included Enstar’s leasehold estate thus making its lease a top lease. The Court without 
mentioning the top lease issue held that the top lease was valid.
A second case, Perry v. Nicor Exploration, involves a top lessee suing to cancel 
oil and gas leases due to the failure to produce in paying quantities during the secondary 
term. The Court did not address or mention the top lease issue, but apparently assumed
6
14 Smith V. Smith, 235 S.W. 2d 886 (Ark. 1951); see also Lindsey v. Christian, 257 S.W. 2d 935 (Ark. 1953); 
Davis v. Davis, 243 S.W. 2d 739 (Ark. 1951); Grimmett v. Estate of Beasley, 777 S.W. 2d 588 (Ark. App. 1989).
15 Enstar Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co., 740 S.W. 2d 630 (Ark. 1987); Perry v. Nicor Exploration, 738 S.W. 2d 
414 (Ark. 1987); Goldsmith v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 767 F. 2d 411 (8th Cir. 1985); Saulsberry, 252 S.W. 2d 
at 835, 836.
their validity even though it denied the cancellation of the bottom lease because 
production in paying quantities was calculated on a unit basis.
Goldsmith v. Diamond Shamrock Corp. was a case before the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit w h ich  was appealed from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Arkansas. The Goldsmiths brought suit against 
Diamond Shamrock for payment of a signing bonus on a top lease. Diamond Shamrock 
argued that the instrument was an option to lease. The case was appealed on procedural 
grounds and neither oil and gas law nor the validity of top leases was discussed.
In Saulsberry v. Siegelr the issue was whether a bottom lease terminated upon 
cessation of production or by reason of a breach of an implied covenant. The lessees of 
a 1951 top lease sought to have a 1922 bottom lease cancelled. The Court refused to 
cancel the 1922 bottom lease and instead cancelled the 1951 top lease as a cloud on the 
bottom lease. The Court did not discuss the validity of top leases and did not even 
classify the leases involved as top or bottom leases.
These cases seem to support the proposition that Arkansas recognizes the theory 
and/or reality of top leases. One assumes that if top leases were invalid in Arkansas 
then one of these Courts would have stated so in its opinion.
D. THE SITUATION TODAY
Top leasing continues to be a controversial subject today because of the complex 
legal issues surrounding top leasing situations and because some in the oil and gas 
industry continue to view top leasing as immoral. This is no surprise. Because, as will
7
be seen in certain situations, the act of top leasing is the equivalent of busting lease 
blocks (claim jumping). The legitimate use of top leases has gained wider acceptance 
and top leasing increased significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. Several factors have 
contributed to the increased use of top leases. In some instances in the 1970s and 1980s 
the use of top leases became almost a competitive necessity in acquiring a lease block 
in certain highly competitive areas. Companies, as a result of the deeper depth of 
prospects, have also found it necessary to top lease their own leases in order to provide 
sufficient time to conduct their operations.
The existence of top leases can either accelerate or impede development of the 
lands under lease. Where the prospect-originating bottom lessee has been top leased by 
a third-party, it may accelerate development of the prospect in order to maintain its 
leases. However in today’s environment where numerous prospects compete for limited 
exploration capital, the bottom lessee may not wish to conduct operations when faced 
with a "claim jumping" top lessee and may forego development of the prospect altogether 
and search for greener pastures.
As evidence that the practice of top leasing has gained wider acceptance, large 
independent drilling companies and major oil companies now engage in the practice of 
top leasing while prior to the 1970s and 1980s most top leases were acquired individually 
by speculators.
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II. CATEGORIES OF TOP LEASES
The process of categorizing types of top leases, like trying to define top leases, 
helps to understand the factual and legal situations in which they arise. Top leases may 
be categorized by either the number of parties involved or the time at which they are 
executed. Each category gives rise to its own unique set of problems.
A. PARTIES
As alluded to above, top leases are primarily described as either two-party top 
leases or three-party top leases. The four Arkansas cases which impliedly acknowledge 
the validity of top leases all involve three-party top leases.
1. TWO-PARTY TOP LEASES
A two-party top lease is a top lease acquired by the same lessee as in the bottom 
lease (only one lessee is involved). It is essentially a new lease taken by the same lessee 
covering the same interest. A lessee may acquire a top lease on its own bottom lease 
for the same reasons it would seek an extension or renewal of its original lease - to gain 
additional time to conduct operations or because of a suspicion that a top lease is about 
to be granted to a third-party.
A problem that may arise in the two-party top lease situation is that the top lease 
may be a substituted contract for, or a novation of, the bottom lease. This issue is of 
particular importance where the top lease and the bottom lease contain different royalty
9
or operating provisions. The question of whether the top lease in a two-party top lease 
situation amounts to a substituted contract or a novation and how to avoid this problem 
are discussed later in this paper. Disputes in two-party top lease situations typically 
involve only the lessor and lessee. However, overriding royalty interest owners under the 
bottom lease may become involved if anti-washout provisions exist. These potential 
problems are also discussed in more detail later in this paper.
2. THREE-PARTY TOP LEASES
The more common type of top lease is the three-party top lease. A three-party 
top lease is a top lease where the top lessee is not the same party as the bottom lessee. 
As noted earlier, the top lessee may acquire a third-party top lease purely for speculative 
purposes, although in some instances in the 1970s and 1980s, the third-party top lease 
became almost a competitive necessity in certain highly competitive areas if you wanted 
to put a prospect together.
The three-party top lease situation raises numerous legal issues and involves 
disputes among the lessor, the bottom lessee and the top lessee. A number of these 
issues are addressed below. A three-party top lease may give rise to claims of 
contractual interference, obstruction, clouding of title or even intentional breach of 
contract. Issues of trespass and the rule against perpetuities may also arise. Attention 
to careful drafting and the use of informed common sense may help avoid these 
problems. However because of the antagonistic and competitive nature of assembling,
10
drilling and developing a prospect it is wise to protect your position on the front end and 
not wait to be top leased.
B. TIME EXECUTED
Top leases may also be categorized by the time at which they were executed - 
during the primary term of the bottom lease or after its primary term (during the 
secondary term). In most instances, the bottom lease is still within its primary term when 
a top lease is executed as the top lessee (in a three-party top lease situation) anticipates 
that the bottom lease will expire at the end of its primary term, or the bottom lessee (in 
a two-party top lease situation) wants to extend and maintain its leasehold position. The 
Goldsmith case is a situation where the bottom lease was in its primary term when the 
top lease was executed. However, a lease covering lands currently burdened by a lease 
in its secondary term is also considered a top lease. A top lease may be acquired during 
the secondary term in the mistaken belief that the bottom lease has expired, or in 
anticipation of some action by the top lessee to cancel or otherwise circumvent the 
bottom lease. The Enstar, Perry and Saulsberry cases are just such situations where the 
bottom leases were being held by production or operations and the top lessees sought 
to have them cancelled respectively for failure to reasonably develop, failure to achieve 
production in paying quantities and for cessation of production. When there are multiple 
top leases on the same interest or where there is an underlying dispute between the 
lessor and bottom lessee, when the top lease is executed will be seen to be important.
11
III. SELECTED TOPICS
A. NOVATION OR SUBSTITUTED CONTRACT
Novation, simply defined, is the substitution of a new obligation for the original 
one. 16 This problem is necessarily limited to the two-party top lease situation since 
novation requires a new agreement which supersedes a prior agreement between the 
same parties. Various courts have taken different approaches when determining whether 
a top lease is a novation of a bottom lease.
If the theory of novation or substituted contract is applied in a two-party top lease 
situation, it follows that the bottom lease will be discharged. 17 Under Professor 
Corbin’s view, whenever two contracts exist which encompass the same subject matter 
as between the same parties and the second contract fails to set forth whether the first 
contract has been discharged, the later agreement between the parties should prevail to 
the extent of any inconsistencies. 18 This view of Professor Corbin was applied in Texas, 
in the context of drilling contracts, in the case of Chastain v. Cooper & Reed. 19 
Although the principles of novation have been applied to oil and gas leases, application 
of the concept has been subject to criticism. 20 In most states (Louisiana being an
16 Ernest, supra note 2, at 966.
17 Brown, supra note 6, at 235.
18 Id.
19 Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257 S.W. 2d 422 (1953).
Brown, supra note 6, at 235.
20
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exception) an oil and gas lease is considered a grant of real property rights, even though 
a combination of both contract and real property rights is involved. 21 One lease or the 
other must grant the present right to explore for oil and gas. It is therefore difficult to 
conceptualize harmonizing two separate leases into one grant. Furthermore, because the 
portion of an oil lease granting the right to explore and produce minerals is primarily a 
grant of real property rights, it has been argued that contractual concepts should not be 
applied at all. The underlying theory of the argument that the concept of novation 
should not be applied in two-party top lease situations appears to be that the parties do 
not intend the original lease to be relinquished or reconveyed to the lessor. Rather, it 
is argued that it is more reasonable to treat the top lease as merely a protective measure 
which will insure the continued right to explore for oil and gas. 22
This author is not aware of an Arkansas case dealing with novation in top leases. 
Because Arkansas arguably categorizes leases as real property rights, 23 there should be 
no reason that other states’ cases should not be accepted in theory and be examined to 
help determine the possible holding in Arkansas.
In a recent case the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the subject of novation 
in Bares v. Stone Oil Corp. 24 The lessors in Bares claimed that the four new leases 
they executed were intended to novate and extinguish four old leases. Revising the lower
21 Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 200-203. 3 (1991).
22 Brown, supra note 6, at 236, 237.
23 Wright, supra note 5.
24 Bares v. Stone Oil Corporation, 510 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987), rehearing denied. (1987).
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court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the lessors, the court of appeals 
held that whether the new leases were intended as top leases or to terminate the old 
leases was not a proper matter for summary judgment as it raised genuine issues of 
material fact.
As the question of novation will not be decided as a matter of law in Louisiana, 
Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor 25 continues to control. In Placid Oil the Court looked to 
various code articles which state that novation of a contract is not to be presumed. In 
order for a novation to be effectuated, such an intent must be clear from the terms of 
the latter agreement. The Court also noted that the facts and circumstances which 
surround the contract’s execution are important to consider in controversies concerning 
novation. After applying these principles the Court determined that there had in fact 
been a novation.
In Placid Oil, the Court of Appeals emphasized the fact that the second lease was 
silent as to the first lease. Additionally, the Court noted that the lessor had acquired 
additional fractional mineral interests in the property after the original lease had been 
executed. As the lease was now more valuable it follows that the lessor would exact a 
higher royalty. Lastly, a letter agreement attached to the lease stated that the later lease 
contained all the terms and conditions agreed upon. Therefore the Court of Appeals 
came to the conclusion that the parties did intend that the second lease work as a 
novation.
25 Placid Oil Company v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 1975), rehearing denied, 329 So. 2d 455
(1976).
14
In Louisiana, then, the courts have been willing to look at both the express terms 
of the agreement and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease. This 
could be a problem for oil companies as most juries, regardless of the facts, will not 
hesitate to answer questions to their disadvantage.
In the case of Obelgoner v. Obelgoner 26, the question of whether a new lease 
to a prior lessee constituted a substituted contract was impliedly addressed by a Texas 
court. In Obelgoner. the lessors executed an initial lease for a ten year primary term. 
Approximately three years prior to the expiration of the initial lease, the successors in 
interest to the lessors executed another lease to the same lessee for a primary term of 
ten years from the "effective date" of the second lease. Subsequently, the lessors 
executed a third lease, this time to a third-party, providing for a primary term of five 
years beginning exactly ten years after the execution of the second lease. The lessee in 
the first two leases brought suit to remove the third lease as a cloud upon his title, 
alleging that the primary term of his second lease did not begin until the expiration of 
his first lease, and therefore his second lease had not expired. The Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals disagreed, holding that the primary term of the second lease began to run upon 
the execution of said lease. Although the Court did not specifically state that the second 
lease was a novation or substituted contract for the first lease, this is implied in that the 
primary term of the second lease was held to begin immediately upon its execution. The 
Court pointed to the fact that the granting clause in the second lease was a present grant 
which contained no reference to the first lease or any collateral agreements between the
15
26 Obelgoner v. Obelgoner, 526 S.W. 2d 790, 53 O. &G.R. 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
parties. Thus the Court concluded that the second lease was effective from its execution 
date, and that the third lease (the third-party top lease) became effective upon the 
expiration of the primary term of the second lease.
Arkansas’ general theory on novation was addressed in the case Orr v. 
Bergemann 27. In this case the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it is essential to a 
novation that there be a mutual agreement by which the new is substituted for the old. 
A novation is the substitution by mutual agreement of the parties of a new obligation for 
an existing one. 28 In order for there to be a novation the old obligation must be 
released and the new obligation substituted in its place. 29 It can be argued that failure 
or refusal to release the bottom lease in accord with statutes requiring same proves that 
no novation was intended. Ark. Code Ann. § 15-73-203 (1987) requires that an oil, gas 
or mineral lessee cancel of record his expired or terminated leases and if he fails to do 
so the lessor can cause the margin of the lease to reflect that it terminated. Other states 
have similar statutes that require leases be cancelled of record. 30 A general legal 
maxim is the presumption that parties will conduct themselves in accordance with the 
law. Therefore a presumption should be that the lessee or lessor would follow the law 
(statute) and release (cancel) the bottom lease if the new lease was intended to be a 
novation.
27 Orr v. Bergemann, 284 S.W. 2d 105 (Ark. 1955).
28 Mclllwain v. Bank of Harrisburg, 713 S. W. 2d 469 (Ark. App. 1986).
29 Ward v. Worthen Bank and Trust Co., 681 S.W . 2d 365, 368 (Ark. 1984).
30 Ala. Code § 9-17-50 (1975); Miss. Code Ann. § 89-5-23 (1972).
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One problem with the novation or substituted contract theory lies in the fact that 
in jurisdictions following the "in place" ownership theory, an oil and gas lease is a 
conveyance of the title to minerals in place. This type of conveyance can bind its parties, 
as well as their heirs and assigns, indefinitely and in perpetuity. This a contract can not 
do. 31 The decision in Placid Oil, however, is somewhat justifiable as Louisiana treats 
oil and gas leases as contracts. 32
In summary, several approaches can be taken in the analysis of two-party top 
leases as to whether the top lease constitutes a novation or substituted contract. In 
Louisiana, as seen above, the courts will look to the instrument as well as the facts 
surrounding the transaction to determine the intention of the parties. It appears that 
Texas, on the other hand, will look primarily to the four comers of the instrument. As 
seen by implication in Obelgoner. a top lease which does not refer to the bottom lease, 
and which is drafted as a present grant, would probably be deemed a novation as to any 
inconsistent terms. Another approach taken by some commentators and, in this author’s 
view, the one that makes common sense, is that an oil lease is primarily a real estate 
transaction, not a contract, and that the contractual theory of novation should not be 
applicable.
Because of the uncertainties in the interpretation of two-party top leases it is 
suggested that great care should be taken in drafting so that the intention of the parties 
with regard to the bottom lease is clearly expressed. The novation problem becomes
17
31 Brown, supra note 6, at 236.
32 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 31, § 114 and accompanying notes (West 1975). See also Brown, The 
Law of Oil and Gas Leases § 3. 02 (2d ed. 1967).
particularly important where the prior lease is held by production or where the operator 
will be drilling at or near the end of the primary term of the first lease. It should be 
obvious that if the top lease provides that it is not a novation of the bottom lease then 
the matter is settled and novation does not apply. If the top lease is made "subject to" 
the bottom lease and the date of the primary term is changed to start at the end of the 
primary term of the bottom lease, it is not legally as clear but should be factually as 
obvious that no novation is intended. Through careful drafting, ambiguities such as those 
discussed above may be avoided.
B. LEGAL THEORIES THAT MAY INVALIDATE A TOP LEASE OR 
GIVE RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION BY A BOTTOM LESSEE
There are a number of legal theories and/or factual realities which may lead to 
several causes of action, often related, which may result in a top lessee being liable for 
injunctive relief, actual damages and in proper circumstances punitive damages. Legal 
theories which may result in top lessee liability are clouding of title, the equitable 
doctrine of obstruction, slander of title, tortious contractual interference, and trespass. 
A review of these causes of action (legal theories) will reveal that many have common 
legal elements and the facts which lead to their existence are often similar and/or 
related. Another interesting point is that several of these theories may apply equally to 
the lessor if he engages in similar conduct in conjunction with the granting of a top lease. 
The doctrine of the rule against perpetuities is an additional legal theory which may 
invalidate a top lease and is discussed below. While several of these legal theories have 
not heretofore been discussed in traditional oil and gas law cases, they are valid general
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legal theories and should, under the proper circumstances, be applicable.
1. CLOUD ON TITLE AND/OR EQUITABLE OBSTRUCTION 
While it may be short sighted and it may kill the prospect, often, when the 
primary term of a lease is about to expire, the lessor may look to another willing lessee 
in order to "protect" his interest. Often this need to "protect" is initiated by a speculator 
contacting the lessor if he thinks the bottom lessee will drill the prospect but not in time 
to maintain the bottom lease. This "protection" is often accomplished by executing 
another oil and gas lease which would go into effect immediately upon termination of 
the first lease. However, the lease must be carefully worded so as to grant a use only 
after the expiration of the present use. By granting a lease on an interest covered by an 
existing lease, it has been successfully argued that the lessor/top lessees have clouded the 
title of the first lessee. One commentator advises that any top lease should expressly 
state that it is taken "subject to" the rights of the prior lessee as expressed in the terms 
of any valid and subsisting bottom lease which is of record and in existence at the time 
of the top lease’s execution. 33 In other words it is critical that the top lease be taken 
subject to the rights of the prior lessee to avoid an obvious action for clouding of title, 
and possibly slander of title or obstruction. However, the inclusion of the "subject to" 
language will not in and of itself protect a top lessee if the facts subsequent to the taking 
of the top lease are sufficient to invoke any of the other theories including tortious 
contractual interference or, if the lessor is involved, intentional breach of contract.
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33 Kemp, supra note 1, at 647.
In the area of oil and gas leases, the doctrine of obstruction is related to but 
different from clouding of title. If the granting of a top lease is combined with other acts 
of either the lessor or the top lessee which appear to repudiate the bottom lease, the 
rights of the bottom lessee may become obstructed. 34 Some acts which when combined 
with the granting of the top lease are a repudiation of the bottom lease are: filing of a 
lawsuit, preventing access to the property, correspondence stating that the bottom lease 
has terminated, obtaining a temporary restraining order and appearing before an 
administrative agency to challenge a unit or well. The equitable doctrine of obstruction 
prevents the lessor or top lessee from obstructing the operations required of the lessee 
under the bottom lease and subsequently claiming that the lease has terminated or 
otherwise come to an end due to the lessee’s failure to comply with the terms of the 
lease. However, these obstructions must be the cause of the lessee’s failure to comply 
with the lease terms, whether by nonproduction or otherwise, before the doctrine will 
apply. Obstruction should have the practical result of perpetuating the bottom lease 
throughout the period of obstruction. 35
Obstruction requires a clear and unequivocal repudiation of the lease. 36
However, this requirement could possibly be met by the mere granting of a naked top 
lease (a top lease that does not contain language showing that it is subordinate to the
34 Id. at 659.
35 Haddock v. McClendon, 266 S.W. 2d 74 (Ark. 1954); Berry v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 188 
F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1951).
36 Ernest, supra note 2, at 963.
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lease currently in effect) since such a lease purports to be immediately effective. 37 It 
should be noted however that if the original lessee is without knowledge of the top lease 
and the top lease is not recorded until after expiration of the original lease, the top lease 
alone should not constitute an obstruction. 38 In addition to actual or constructive notice 
of the top lease, the bottom lessee must prove that he suspended operations as a result 
thereof. 39 Unlike slander of title, malice is not an essential element of obstruction. 40 
The remedy for obstruction is typically to clear the title of the competing top lease and, 
if production is involved, damages for wrongfully extracted minerals may be recovered. 41
Although the execution of a naked top lease alone may constitute obstruction, 
claims of obstruction generally arise where a top lease has been executed and the lessor 
or top lessee engages in other actions in repudiation of the bottom lease. 42 Professor 
Kuntz states that for the claim of obstruction to arise the lessor must be engaged in a 
course of conduct which includes not only a total repudiation of the lease, but some form 
of physical interference which could be a lawsuit. 43
37 Kemp, supra note 1, at 659.
38 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas § 26. 14 at 426 (15th ed. 1989).
39 Atlantic Richfield Company v. Hilton, 437 S.W. 2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 
905 (1969).
40 Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S. W. 2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), writ re’d  n. r. e.
41 Brown, supra note 6, at 217.
42 
42 Kemp, supra note 1, at 659.
43 Kuntz, supra note 38, at 425, n. 18.
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In the Arkansas case of Haddock v. McClendon, 44 the lessors notified the lessees 
in writing that the lease had terminated a few days after the end of the primary term but 
while the lessor was attempting to drill a well. This notification was followed by the 
lessees filing suit asking title to be quieted in them. The Court declined to terminate the 
lease stating "appellants had a right, as we have mentioned, to wait until practically the 
last day to begin drilling, and cannot therefore be penalized for lack of diligence on that 
account, and since they were stopped by appellees on March 4 (the date of the letter to 
lessee), the question of diligence thereafter never arose. " The Haddock case can be used 
as persuasive authority that Arkansas courts have accepted the common sense argument 
that actions by a lessor, or top lessee, which tend to repudiate the bottom lessee’s title 
constitute obstruction and would excuse the bottom lessee from performance until a 
reasonable time after the obstruction is removed.
In a Texas case, Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe 45. the lessor executed a top lease and 
also sent a letter to the bottom lessee’s assignee repudiating the bottom lease and 
demanding release thereof. These actions relieved the assignee, just as in Haddock, of 
its duty to operate the well until settlement of the controversy.
It should be noted that like Haddock and Goodroe the Fifth Circuit, in Berry v. 
Tide Water Associated Oil Co. 46, interpreting Mississippi law, in a footnote stated that
44 See note 35.
45 Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
46 See note 35.
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the plaintiff had executed what is in effect a top lease, thus forbidding operations by the 
defendants (bottom lessees).
When obstruction occurs, the lessee is excused from performance until the 
obstruction is removed. Once the obstruction is removed, the period of time in which 
the lessee may then establish production (to extend the lease beyond its primary term) 
becomes an issue. There are two lines of thought on this question. The lessee’s 
extension may be for the period of time that was remaining on his lease when the 
obstruction occurred 47, or the extension may be for a period of time, reasonable under 
the circumstances, in which to proceed with drilling. 48
Generally, there will be no finding of obstruction if the top lease recognizes the 
existence of the bottom lease and both the lessor and top lessee refrain from asserting 
rights superior to those of the bottom lessee or hindering the bottom lessee’s actions to 
extend his lease. Again, it must be emphasized that the top lease must acknowledge the 
validity of the bottom lease. This not only operates as notice to the parties but also 
helps to avoid misunderstandings between the parties. When a bottom lessee has been 
top leased he should be alert for signs to support a claim of obstruction and consider 
seeking a court order excusing performance until the title is resolved. Such a court order 
would protect him in advance from claims that his lease had terminated pursuant to its 
terms for failure to produce. It would be helpful to know in advance whether a 
particular jurisdiction will remedy obstruction with a reasonable time to fulfill lease
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47 Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1952).
48 Jones v. M oore, 338 P. 2d 872 (Okla. 1959).
requirements or merely suspend lease requirements during the period of obstruction. 
Based on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s application of good faith and diligence tests in 
Haddock the argument can be made that Arkansas will merely suspend the lease 
requirement during the period of obstruction and allow a reasonable time thereafter to 
begin operations.
The top lessee’s lease may also be extended in the situation where he is 
dispossessed by the lessor’s dispute with the bottom lessee. Until the dispute is resolved, 
the top lease should be extended. 49 The mineral owner in Massey, a Texas case, had 
executed a top lease before seeking a declaratory judgment that bottom leases had 
expired. Subsequent settlement agreements between the mineral owner and bottom 
lessee purporting to permit the bottom lessee to resume production under his old leases 
could not defeat the valid top lease which was prior in time to the settlement 
agreements. The Court held that the top lease was extended until the dispute with the 
bottom lessee was resolved.
2. SLANDER OF TITLE
The doctrine of obstruction can be carried one step further by the doctrine of 
slander of title. While the term "slander of title" is highly criticized the term is well 
recognized. The term is used to describe intentional words or conduct which tend to 
bring into question the right or title of another to property. 50 This requirement of
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49 Massey v. Davis, 650 S.W. 2d 551 (Tex. App. 11 Dist. 1983), error refused n.r.e. (1983). 
50 50 AmJur. 2d. Libel and Slander § 539 (1972).
intentional words or conduct differentiates slander of title from cloud on title which does 
not require intentional conduct. In fact an action for slander of title will not lie if the 
statement or conduct was made in good faith. 51
For an action based on slander of title there must be a showing of actual 
malice. 52 An obstruction can be so willful that it brings rise to a slander action. 53 It 
is obvious that the more egregious the actions of the lessor or top lessee the greater the 
possibility for the Court to find that slander of title has occurred. In a slander of title 
claim the bottom lessee can obtain not only time to remedy the obstruction but also 
damages. 54
Generally the elements of slander of title are: (1) a publication, (2) that the 
publication was false, (3) actual malice and (4) damage to the opposing party. 55 A 
showing of good faith or a reasonable basis for the obstruction will usually defeat a claim 
of slander of title.
This author is aware of no Arkansas oil and gas or top lease cases involving the 
doctrine of slander of title.
51 Id. at § 544.
52 Elliott v. Elliott, 482 S.W. 2d 123, 128 (Ark. 1972).
53 Jackson and Weissbrod, Top Leasing in the Appalachian Basin, Eastern Mineral Law Institute 12-1, 
12-11 (1985).
54 Id.
55 See Hicks v. Early, 357 S.W. 2d 647 (Ark. 1962).
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3. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
In legal theory and factual proof the doctrine of tortious interference with a 
contract can be similar to the doctrine of obstruction and to slander of title.
Because the bottom lease is a contract the bottom lessee may bring an action for 
interference with his contractual rights if a top lessee, with notice of the bottom lease, 
begins to drill or conduct other operations on the land or otherwise interferes with the 
bottom lease without first verifying that the bottom lease has expired. 56 Therefore, the 
top lessee must be certain that his lease recognizes any outstanding leases or option 
agreements. He must further verify that the term of the bottom lease has in fact expired 
prior to beginning drilling or other operations or from otherwise interfering with the 
bottom lease. In short, a top lessee cannot interfere with or cause a breach of the 
bottom lease without suffering the consequences.
Louisiana does not recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a 
contract except in certain limited employment circumstances. 57 Mississippi, Alabama, 
Texas and Oklahoma recognize the cause of action for tortious interference with a 
contract 58, but have not decided any top leasing cases based on this theory. It is 
possible that punitive damages would be recoverable for this action in tort.
56 Kemp, supra note 1, at 659.
57 Charles v. Faust, 487 So. 2d 612, 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Lynn v. Berg Mechanical, Inc., 
582 So. 2d 902, 911 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1991).
58 Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 254 (Miss. 1985); Gross v. Lowder Rlty. Better Homes & 
Gardens, 494 So. 2d 590, 597 (Ala. 1986); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. 729 S.W. 2d 768 (Tex. lst Dist. 1987) 
cert. dismissed 485 U.S. 994 , 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988); Niemeyer v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 789 
P. 2d 1318 (Okla. 1990).
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Arkansas, while recognizing the cause of action, has yet to decide any top leasing 
cases. Mid-South Beverages. Inc, v. Forrest City Grocery Co.. Inc. 59, is a recent 
Arkansas case discussing the theory of tortious interference with a contract. In this case 
the Arkansas Supreme Court listed the elements for the tort of interference. For there 
to be a claim for interference with a contract there must be a showing that: (1) there 
was the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) 
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy by the interferer; (3) intentional interference 
inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy and (4) 
damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.
In applying Mid-South to a top lease situation, one should realize that (1) the 
bottom lease would be the valid contractual relationship; (2) the fact that the bottom 
lease was recorded should be sufficient knowledge of the relationship; (3) the execution 
of the top lease if coupled with other acts like obstruction would be the interference 
causing a breach and (4) the damages could be the value of any lease that the bottom 
lessee lost or the cost of delaying operating or the cost to establish its lease or possibly 
the amount of production lost to drainage during the period, etc. It is apparent that 
factually the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a contract are often 
present when there has been an obstruction or slander of title by the lessee of a top 
lease.
When the lessor becomes involved in the act, it takes on a character much like 
that of obstruction and can result in intentional breach of contract. The complaint must
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59 Mid-South Beverages, Inc. v. Forrest City Grocery, 778 S.W. 2d 218 (Ark. 1989).
be couched in terms of intentional breach of contract because the state of Arkansas does 
not presently recognize a cause of action for tortious breach of contract. 60 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that presently the tort of bad faith for breach of 
contract only applies to insurance contracts. Traditionally the recovery of punitive 
damages for breach of contract is only allowed in limited situations (where a "special 
relationship" exists between the parties), one being breach of a fiduciary duty. To 
support a punitive damages claim, a willful or malicious act must exist in conjunction 
with the contract. 61 It would be interesting, given the legal status of oil and gas lessees 
to lessors (it is, this author would argue, a special relationship), to see if an Arkansas 
court would allow a claim for tortious breach of contract against a lessor who has 
maliciously obstructed a bottom lessee. It is clear that regardless of the legal action 
used, neither the lessor nor the top lessee has the right to infringe on the contractual 
rights of the bottom lessee, and should suffer the consequences if they do.
If the bottom lessee’s contractual rights are violated by the top lessee in 
cooperation with the lessor there is the possible remedy of specific performance. A 
Mississippi case dealing with the specific performance of a real estate contract and 
intentional breach of same is interesting and may be susceptible to application to top 
lease situations. 62 In Hamilton the Court found that the plaintiff was ready, willing and 
able to perform his real estate contract and the Court therefore specifically enforced the
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60 Note, 13 UALR Law Journal 379, 382 (1991); see also Pennington, Punitive Damages fo r Breach 
of Contract A Core Sample From the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 Ark L. Rev. 31 (1989).
61 Brill, Punitive Damages in Arkansas, Arkansas Law Notes (1990).
62 Hamilton v. Bradford, 502 F. Supp. 822 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
contract and determined that a subsequent sales contract was null and void. The Court 
also allowed for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. In Mississippi attorneys’ fees are only 
recoverable if punitive damages are justified. If the logic in the Hamilton case is applied, 
to the top lease scenario, then if the top lessee and/or lessor violate the bottom lessee’s 
rights in a malicious manner the top lease might be cancelled by the Court. In addition, 
the top lessee and lessor might also be liable to the bottom lessee for the consequences 
including attorneys fees and punitive damages.
4. TRESPASS
The application of the doctrine of trespass in a top lease situation is very limited 
in scope. Trespass does not apply to co-tenancy situations. Factually it will be unusual 
and difficult in the top lease scenario for trespass to apply. Generally, trespass will apply 
only when there is one tract and one lease on the lands or unit in question. Stated 
differently, as long as the operator has a legal right (owns a lease or minerals in the 
unit) to be on the lands or unit trespass does not exist.
Trespass is an intrusion which invades a possessor’s protected interest in exclusive 
possession. 63 When it can be shown that the top lessee had actual or constructive 
notice of a valid prior interest, the court may find the top lessee to be a trespasser if he 
conducts exploration or drilling operations after expiration of the primary term of the 
bottom lease and if he has no other right to be on the unit in question. This situation 
generally arises when the bottom lease has been extended into a secondary term by
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63 75 AmJur. 2d Trespass § 1 (1991).

profit that could have been obtained had the party drilled the well themselves (working 
interest measure). 67
Arkansas has no cases dealing with the bottom lessee as a trespasser. The general 
law as to the extraction of minerals can be examined to ascertain the remedies available 
to the bottom lessee. The Arkansas cases involving the wrongful removal of hard 
minerals are useful in determining remedies. 68 In these cases good faith or the lack 
thereof can affect the amount of damages. If the trespass was in bad faith the amount 
of recovery is the amount of minerals taken. The measure of damages for good faith 
trespass is the value of the minerals produced less the expense of production. 69
In determining whether the trespass is innocent or willful, the court will look to
the trespasser’s sincerity and good faith expressions of his intentions. 70 In Swiss Oil
Corp. v. Hupp, 71 a case before the Kentucky Supreme Court, the top lessee was found
to be an innocent trespasser since he had acted on the advice of counsel and there was
doubt surrounding the bottom lessee’s claim to the leasehold. The Court stated that:
The conditions and behavior are usually such that the court 
can determine whether the trespass was perpetuated in a 
spirit of wrongdoing, without knowledge that it was wrong, 
or whether it was done under a bona fide mistake, or as 
where the circumstances were calculated to induce or justify
67 Id. at 423, see also Wright, supra note 5 at 236.
68 Wright, supra note 5 at 235.
69 Id. at 238 citing Young v. Ethyl Corp., 581 F. 2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978); National Lead Co. v. Magnet 
Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 213 (W .D. Ark. 1964).
70 Jackson & Weissbrod, supra note 53, at 12-12.
71 Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W. 2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
31
that reasonably prudent man, acting with a proper sense of 
the rights of others, to go in and continue along the way. 72
In the case of a willful trespasser, the violating party is responsible for gross 
revenue (the gross value of all oil or gas produced by the trespasser). On the other 
hand, an innocent trespasser is only accountable for net profits. The net profits will be 
calculated by subtracting the reasonable production costs from the value of the oil or gas 
at the well. 73 The innocent trespasser, therefore, is allowed to recover proper costs and 
production expenses but is not allowed to profit from his offense. Reasonable costs and 
expenses of production should include the cost of drilling the well, and have also been 
held to include water flooding expenses, overpayment of royalties, ad valorem taxes, the 
cost of drilling a dry well, and operating expenses subsequent to the filing of the law 
suit. 74 However, income taxes, legal fees, and the value of improvements to the 
leasehold property have been held not to be reasonable expenses. 75
The bottom lessee might also be found in trespass if he fails to relinquish his 
leasehold at its expiration. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Lone Star Producing Co. 
v. Walker 76, addressed the issue of the bottom lessee as the trespasser. Here, the top 
lessee was allowed to recover damages from the bottom lessee since there was no valid 
bottom lease. The bottom lessee’s lease had been extended into its secondary term by
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72 Id. at 1041.
73 Id. at 1044.
74 Jackson and Weissbrod, supra note 53, at 12-13.
75 Id.
76 Lone Star Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971).
production. A top lease was executed during a cessation of production during the 
secondary term. The bottom lessee failed to resume production within the sixty day 
period allowed under the lease; however the bottom lessee continued in possession after 
the lease had terminated claiming the continuous reworking provision of the lease was 
being complied with. In addition to clearing the cloud on his title, the top lessee 
recovered damages in the amount of the value of production from the time the bottom 
lessee completed reworking operations less reasonable production costs. 77 The Court 
did not discuss the willful/innocent trespasser distinction, but merely affirmed the 
chancellor’s ruling on damages.
For a top lessee to avoid a charge of trespass, it may be necessary for him to 
obtain an affidavit from the lessor (assuming he is not involved) stating that the bottom 
lease has terminated or rely in good faith on a title opinion or like instrument. A release 
from the bottom lessee would be more effective, but generally much more difficult to 
obtain.
5. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The common law of England was responsible for creating the rule against 
perpetuities, which is still recognized in many jurisdictions today. The Rule was 
promulgated to prevent the creation of remote future interests in land that might never 
vest. At common law, the rule against perpetuities provides that "no interest within its 
scope is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life or lives
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77 Id. at 501.
in being at the creation of the interest to which is added the period of gestation, if 
gestation exists." 78
The primary term of a top lease typically commences upon the expiration of the 
bottom lease. If the bottom lease contains a habendum clause which keeps the lease 
alive for a secondary term "so long thereafter" as oil or gas is produced or operations are 
conducted (which virtually all oil, gas and mineral leases do contain), it is conceivable 
that the bottom lease could be maintained indefinitely. There is therefore no assurance 
that the bottom lease would expire within the time period provided by the Rule, and 
likewise there is no assurance that the top lease will be effective (its primary term will 
commence) within the perpetuities period.
It has been argued that the scenario outlined above constitutes a violation of the 
rule against perpetuities. This argument is based on the premise that the interest of the 
top lessee does not vest (which is the key factor in determining whether the Rule is 
violated) until the primary term of the top lease commences and the top lessee has the 
right to explore for oil and gas. It is thus stated that "the vesting of the top lease is 
contingent upon the occurrence of ‘an uncertain future event’". 79
Obviously if a lessor purported to grant a top lease which was to vest (as opposed 
to becoming effective) upon the expiration of the bottom lease, the top lease would 
violate the Rule. 80 However, it is suggested that the following analysis should be
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78 Brown, Law of Oil and Gas Leases, §§ 802-812, at 961 (1973).
79 Hill, Top Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 Pepperdine L. Rev. 773, 779 (1983).
80
Ernest, supra note 2, at 961.
applied to a top lease which purports to be a present grant, but which is subject to the 
bottom lease (the primary term will not commence until the expiration of the bottom 
lease). Upon the execution of an oil and gas lease with a "so long thereafter" habendum 
clause, the lessee acquires a determinable estate. The interest remaining in the lessor 
is a possibility of reverter, which is a vested interest and is therefore not subject to the 
rule against perpetuities. 81 Arkansas as well as several other states have statutes 
providing that any interest in land is alienable 82 including future interests. Therefore, 
if the top lease is viewed as a partial alienation of the lessor’s possibility of reverter, this 
is merely the conveyance of a vested interest, w hich  is not subject to the Rule. 83 It is 
this author’s view that the above is the proper analysis of top leases and that the rule 
against perpetuities should not apply to top leases.
As previously noted, the Mississippi case of Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., implies that 
a top lease is a present grant of a future interest. 84 It is therefore arguable that 
Mississippi would not apply the Rule to top leases. Since Arkansas’s statute providing 
that an interest in land is alienable is similar to the Mississippi statute the argument can 
be made that Arkansas would also not apply the rule against perpetuities to top leases.
In any event, a jurisdiction applying the Rule may not automatically void the 
interest purported to be created, but may reform the instrument under the doctrine of
81 Hill, supra note 79 at 780, 781.
82 Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-1 (1972); Ala. Code § 35-4-1 (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 18-12-102(a) (1987).
83 Ernest, supra note 2, at 962; Brown, supra note 6, at 227.
84 Barnett v. Getty Oil Company, 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972).
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cy pres, or apply the "wait and see" approach. 85 Mississippi adopted the "wait and see" 
approach in Phelps v. Shropshire. 86 under which the interest is valid if the contingency 
actually happens during the perpetuities period. The rule against perpetuities has not 
been applied in Mississippi in a top lease situation. This author is aware of no cases 
indicating that Arkansas has adopted the "wait and see" approach. In Stoltz, Wagner and 
Brown 87 the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, in 
applying Oklahoma law reformed a top lease by cy pres power to prevent the top lease 
from being a violation of the rule against perpetuities. The top lease was to take effect 
after the expiration of the existing lease. If the existing lease was held by production this 
would put the top lease in violation of the rule against perpetuities. The intent of the 
top lessee was applied and reformation of the top lease was allowed. Arkansas has a 
statute allowing the cy pres power to reform charitable trusts, however this author is not 
aware of any other statutory cy pres power in Arkansas.
One precaution against the perpetuities problem which could be used in drafting 
a top lease would be to include a "savings clause", which states the latest point at which 
the primary term of the top lease will begin. However, the best approach to the 
perpetuities problem is to draft the top lease as a present grant which vests immediately,
85 See 61 AmJur. 2d Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation §§ 29, 31 (1981).
86 Phelps v. Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1966).
87 See note 3.
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subject to the existing lease. Where the interest vests immediately, but enjoyment or 
utilization is postponed, this should present no perpetuities problem 88.
C. EFFECT OF POOLING. PRODUCTION.
OR OPERATIONS ON TOP LEASES
Essential to a basic understanding of the effect of pooling, production or 
operations on top leases is the basic principle, that the terms and provisions of the 
bottom lease control. The outcome of most top lease/bottom lease conflicts is dictated 
by the language contained in the bottom lease. The most commonly litigated issues are 
the effect bottom lease provisions concerning pooling (voluntary or compulsory), 
production or well operations have on the top lease. The following sections discuss the 
effect of pooling, production and well operations on the top lease.
1. POOLING
Pooling questions involve the application of basic oil and gas law principles as 
modified by the concepts of voluntary pooling (under the lease) or statutory or 
compulsory pooling (by appropriate governmental agency). The effect of pooling on top 
leases and correspondingly on bottom leases is such that it creates numerous interesting 
questions few of which have specific case or statutory authority on point.
Acts of pooling either under the lease (voluntary) or by the appropriate oil and
88 Ernest, supra note 2, at 961.
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gas regulatory body (compulsory by -- Corporation Commission-Okla., Railroad Commis-
sion-Texas, Oil and Gas Commission-Arkansas, Oil and Gas Board-Mississippi and 
Alabama, Conservation Commission- La. ) will often continue the bottom lease. The 
relationship between the parties and the relative equities will also be seen to be 
important in the cases discussed below. Further, in instances of statutory (regulatory) 
pooling the force majeure provision of the lease may apply to extend all leases in the 
drilling (probably production also) unit. In certain instances, the application of 
constitutional law impacts the terms of the lease and/or the pertinent regulatory statutes 
and will protect the bottom lease. Arkansas authority (case law and statutory) discussed 
below can lead to the conclusion, when viewed in conjunction with similar law from other 
jurisdictions, that pooling will extend the bottom lease. In short, if the option of 
production or operations on the leased premises is not practicable or possible, there may 
be another avenue available to the bottom lessee to protect his position. That is a 
bottom lessee may choose (or be forced) to pool his interest, which in appropriate 
circumstances, should perpetuate his lease position. The cases set out below when 
viewed together indicate a willingness by courts to give the bottom lessee some 
protection from assaults by top lessees and lessors. These cases seem to indicate that a 
bottom lessee is entitled to the court’s protection when it operates within the bounds of 
the lease provisions or those rights afforded it under statutory pooling. The only 
authority to the contrary is the widely criticized, and in this author’s view, patently 
erroneous, Envirogas case set out below.
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The New York courts were faced with a top lease/bottom lease pooling problem in 
Envirogas v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. 89 There, pursuant to the terms of the 
bottom lease, the bottom lessee prepared a plan of pooling, then drilled the required 
wells on other acreage pursuant to the plan within the period of the bottom leases. The 
top lessee objected, claiming that the unit designation was a sham, was not made in good 
faith, and was solely for the purpose of extending the bottom lease. The top lessee 
sought a declaratory judgment that the unitization was invalid and a preliminary 
injunction restraining further drilling by the bottom lessee. The trial court granted the 
bottom lessee’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the top lessee had no standing to 
challenge the bottom lessee’s pooling and that the top lessee is not the beneficiary of the 
implied covenant to pool in good faith. The appellate court, however, reinstated the 
complaint holding that the top lessee was suing to protect its own alleged present 
possessory leasehold estate. While the court noted that the duty to pool in good faith 
runs primarily to the land owners, it appears to allow the top lessee to enforce this duty 
by claiming that the bottom lease is no longer valid and existing. The appellate court 
affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against the bottom lessee, holding that 
the bottom lessee had at least facially complied with the pooling clause of the lease, and 
that the top lessee had not demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits.
89 Envirogas v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 465 N. Y. S. 2d 141 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), aff'd  in part 
and rev’d  in part, 469 N.Y. S. 2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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The apparent (erroneous) establishment of the bottom lessees duty to pool in 
good faith toward the top lessees is still being forged. 90 It appears from the Envirogas 
cases and their successors that the New York Appellate Court is ignoring the law from 
other jurisdictions including the common sense approach developed by the Courts in the 
cases discussed below, as well as the apparent law and the facts of the case before it, to 
allow the top lessee to win. This author tried to find out the real story behind these 
cases, but has had no success in doing so. Therefore, the comments in this paper are 
limited to the reported decisions which have been criticized by authors in addition to this 
author. If the result of these New York decisions is to establish a right on behalf of the 
top lessee to block a bottom lessee from pooling and drilling near the end of the primary 
term to develop its leases, then it is contrary to the law in Arkansas and other states. 
Hopefully, if this is actually what the New York Court intended, this ruling will not 
extend to other states. 91
Even a cursory examination of the Envirogas decisions reveals that the New York 
Court completely ignored numerous pertinent legal and factual matters which other 
states’ courts have thought important. The New York Court ignores the fact that there 
is no relationship, contractual or otherwise, between the bottom lessee and the top 
lessee, that the bottom lessee is free to pool under the terms and conditions of its bottom 
lease, that the top lessee and bottom lessee are in fact in a competitive and antagonistic
90 Nickerson v. Winkle, 556 N.Y.S. 2d 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Doran and Associates Inc. v. 
Envirogas, 492 N.Y.S. 2d 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Envirogas v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 496 
N.Y.S. 2d 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); See note 89.
91 Kramer and Martin, Pooling and Unitization § 8. 06 (3rd Ed. 1991).
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position (i.e. there is no fiduciary, trustee or any other special relationship), that almost 
all (I assume New York’s does) oil and gas regulatory statutes provide that production, 
operations, etc. on a unit are deemed production, operations, etc. from each and every 
lease and tract in the unit and that most states, including Arkansas, Mississippi and 
others, hold that the bottom lessee can wait until near the end of the primary term to 
commence operations under the lease (which should include the act of pooling). It is 
submitted that the courts of Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Louisiana and others as 
seen from the following cases would not ignore the above matters and would not follow 
the New York Court’s erroneous position.
Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne. Inc., 92 is an interesting Oklahoma case 
concerning what extends leases beyond their primary term in so far as pooling and/or 
unitization is involved. In this case the operator made a diligent attempt to acquire an 
order allowing it to drill on the unit which effort resulted in preliminary approval to drill 
a unit well not on the lessor’s lands. However, the order was signed one day after the 
end of primary term of the lease. The trial court found that the pendency of the spacing 
proceeding coupled with the commencement and diligent drilling of a prospective unit 
well triggered the force majeure clause of the lease, because the operator was prohibited 
by statute from drilling a well on the plaintiff's land and that the force majeure clause 
contemplated the situation and excused compliance for the period of the statutory 
prohibition. The appellate court reversed the trial court stating that such a holding 
would allow the lessee to maintain leases in force and effect after the primary terms
92 Kuykendall v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 741 P. 2d 869 (Okla. 1987).
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simply by filing an application to drill. The appeals court rejected the lessee’s arguments 
relating to the force majeure clause and pooling. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court’s decision. After a lengthy 
discussion of the Oklahoma conservation statutes and their effect, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that the combination of the commence clause in the lease and the 
statutory provisions for formation of spacing units have the legal effect of continuing a 
lease where drilling is commenced to a common source of supply named in a pending 
drilling and spacing application if the well so commenced is completed as a producing 
well. The commentator in the Oil and Gas Reporter states that both the diligence used 
in seeking a spacing order and the fact that the lessee was also the operator should be 
irrelevant. He further states that the results reached by the court should be the same, 
that is, the lease should be extended, as to any lease within a proposed unit the primary 
term of which expires while a spacing application is pending and while the unit well is 
being drilled. It is obvious how the Kuykendall case holding could be applied in a top 
lease situation.
It is submitted that this holding, its logic and application of the pooling statutes 
is correct and will be seen again in several other cases which follow. This holding and 
the others using similar logic are based on a central idea that if the bottom lessee is 
attempting to pool the lease either under its terms or in accordance with the applicable 
statutes and rules to get a well drilled then the lease will be extended. It is therefore 
possible that, the filing of an application for a permit to drill will extend any lease
42
ultimately included in the unit. Furthermore, as discussed under the obstruction 
doctrine, if a lessor or top lessee tries to delay a pending application or otherwise 
interferes with the bottom lessee these should be additional reasons for a similar holding. 
A top lessee’s appearance before a regulatory agency, regardless of whether he has 
standing, could likewise be construed as contractual interference. If the appearance is 
merely a delaying tactic so that the lease will expire then there is tortious interference 
with the bottom lease.
In Gorenflo v. Texaco 93, a lease clause authorized lessees to declare a unit when 
declaration of such unit would be necessary or advisable to properly develop and operate 
the property so as to promote conservation, avoid waste and unnecessary wells, or to 
comply with spacing orders. The lessees formed a unit and began conducting operations 
when the primary lease terms were about to expire. The well was spudded after 
expiration of the primary term. The lessor sought cancellation of the lease alleging, inter 
alia, that the pooling clause did not authorize declaration of a unit for purposes of an 
exploratory well, that the declaration was made in bad faith merely to extend the lease, 
and that operations on the unit were insufficient. The Court held that the formation of 
the unit for the purposes of an exploratory well was authorized by the lease form. The 
fact that the pooling arrangement also helped retain the leases did not affect this finding 
nor did it point to bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the lessee. The Court further
93 Gorenflo v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 722 (M.D. La. 1983).
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held that the lessee’s operations on the unit prior to the expiration of the primary term 
(making inspections of drill pipe and placing portions of the drilling rig on the well site) 
were sufficient operations to extend the lease. From this decision it should be obvious 
that Louisiana would not follow the Envirogas cases.
Mississippi has also addressed the issue of pooling just prior to the expiration of 
the primary term, in the context of a challenge of an oil and gas board order creating a 
unit, and indicated that it is a valid exercise of the lessee’s rights. 94 Also, forced pooling 
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-7 and subsequent drilling within the unit will 
continue leases on all lands within the unit. 95 This rule is followed even as to lessors 
who refused to agree to the pooling. 96 The Tri M case involved a top lessee who 
argued that the bottom lease had expired for failure to obtain production or conduct 
operations on the leased premises during the primary term of the bottom lease. In this 
case Getty Oil Company, which owned the bottom lease, refused to sign the operating 
agreement and participate in drilling costs. Getty refused to sign the operating 
agreement because the unit was force-pooled as a gas unit and if the well was completed 
as an oil well the unit would be down sized excluding Getty’s acreage. Getty did not 
want to advance costs for drilling, take the risk of a dry hole, then be precluded from 
receiving any production if the operation was successful as an oil well.
94 State Oil and Gas Board v. Crane, 271 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1972).
95 Tri M Petroleum Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 792 F. 2d 558 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Superior Oil Co. 
v. Beery, 63 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1953), sugg. o f error overruled, 64 So. 2d 357 (Miss. 1953).
96 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Hutchins, 64 So. 2d 733 (Miss. 1953), sugg. o f error overruled in 
part, 65 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1953).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Mississippi law, and citing in
particular Superior Oil Co. v. Beery, held that involuntary pooling altered the lessee’s
rights and obligations and would extend the bottom lease by production or operations
within the unit. The Court in Tri M noted that it is well established in Alabama and
Louisiana that drilling anywhere in the involuntarily-pooled unit constitutes drilling on
all property in the unit. 97 Arkansas statutes likewise provide for forced pooling, and
provide that all operations on any part of a drilling unit shall be deemed operations on
all lands in the unit. 98 Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-305 (b) (Supp. 1991) states:
(b) All operations, including, but not limited to, the commencement, 
drilling, or operation of a well upon any portion of a drilling unit for which 
an integration order has been entered shall be deemed for all purposes the 
conduct of operations upon each separately owned tract and interest in the 
drilling unit by the several owners thereof. The portion of the production 
allocated to the owner of each tract or interest included in a drilling unit 
formed by an integration order shall, when produced, be considered for all 
purposes as if it had been produced from the tract or interest by a well 
drilled thereon.
Pooling and operations within the primary term anywhere in the unit should therefore 
extend any bottom lease which is in the unit in these states.
The rationale for such a holding under the Arkansas and Mississippi statutes and 
other similar states is based partially on the takings provision of constitutional law. In 
Superior Oil Co. v. Beery, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that forced pooling must 
extend the primary terms of all leases in the unit to protect the constitutional rights of
97 Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 51 So. 2d 87 (La. 1950); Matthews v. Goodrich Oil Co., 471 So. 2d 
938 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1985), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 1105 (La. 1985); Sheffield v. Exxon Corp., 424 So. 2d 1297 
(Ala. 1982).
98 Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-72-302 to 305 (1987).
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all lessees in the unit, because a well can be drilled only on one tract covered by a lease 
in the unit. Thus, although the right to drill is taken from the force pooled lessees, their 
leases are nonetheless extended by the forced pooling. Likewise, the Court held that the 
constitutional rights of mineral owners in the unit are also protected. Although the 
mineral owner no longer has the right to have a well drilled on his tract, he is given the 
right to receive the same portion of production from the unit well he would have been 
entitled to if a well had been drilled on his tract. Interestingly, the lease in the case did 
not have a pooling or force majeure clause and would have otherwise terminated but for 
the statutory pooling.
It should be noted that in Tri M. there were operations in the pooled unit prior 
to the expiration of the lease involved. Superior Oil Co. v. Beery, however, indicates that 
involuntary pooling alone (without operations) would extend the lease of a third party 
lessee. There is some question as to whether pooling alone, absent other circumstances, 
would serve to hold a lease of the operator. Because of the similarity between the 
Mississippi statutes regulating pooling and those of Arkansas, the arguments in Superior 
and Tri M should be persuasive.
At least one Texas court has held in a top lease situation that improper pooling 
will not extend the primary term of a lease under its habendum clause. 99 This case is 
not however, what it appears on first review. This case turned on the particular 
provisions in the bottom lease and the ultimate outcome of the case appears to be that 
the top lessee was denied any relief. The lessee in Hunt Oil pooled and unitized a 92
99 Hunt Oil Co. V. Moore, 656 S. W. 2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), error ref'd  n.r.e. (1984).
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acre tract covered by his lease into two 160 acre production units. The lease in question 
authorized pooling into units not to exceed 40 acres for oil, unless larger units were 
"prescribed” by regulatory authorities. The Court held that the field rules in effect 
"prescribed" 80 acre units, but "permitted" 160 acre units in certain circumstances. 
Because the lease allowed pooling in excess of 40 acres only where "prescribed" by 
regulatory authorities, the Court held that the lease had not been validly pooled by 
attempting to include it in a 160 acre unit. The lease was held terminated since there 
had been no production from the leased premises or lands validly pooled with said 
premises. What really appears to have happened was that the top lessee was denied an 
accounting for past production and effectively removed from the unit. In states like 
Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama where unit size is set by the regulatory agency the 
bottom lessor, Hunt, would have prevailed even under this lease form.
Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Co. 100, is in accord with Hunt Oil in relying on the explicit 
language contained in the lease pooling provision in determining whether a lease is 
validly pooled. In Vogel, a 50 acre tract in Oklahoma was included in a 320 acre unit 
at the unilateral request of the lessee, Tenneco. The pooling provision in the lease 
provided in part that "unitized tracts may not exceed... 160 acres for gas... except when 
any governmental authority prescribes or permits a larger unit. " The lessor argued that 
the exception portion of the pooling provision applied only where a larger unit was 
unavoidably compelled by governmental order, or where both the lessor and lessee 
requested a larger unit. The Court held that the language of the pooling clause clearly
100 Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Company, 465 F. 2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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allowed any unit permitted by governmental authority. The Court noted, in rejecting the 
lessor’s arguments, that if the parties had intended the result sought by the lessor, they 
would not have included the words "or permits" in the provision. The Court noted that 
the lessor’s interpretation could only be followed if those two important words were 
ignored or were read out of the provision.
In Gordon v. Crown Central Petroleum Company 101, an Arkansas case, the 
pooling provision in question allowed for gas units not exceeding 660 acres. The 
provision contained no exception for larger units prescribed or permitted by the 
appropriate authority. However, the lease contained a governmental regulations or force 
majeure clause which provided that the lease was subject to all governmental regulations. 
The lease in question was force integrated into a 727 acre unit upon motion of a third 
party. The lessor sought cancellation of the lease for breach of the pooling clause. The 
Court held that the force majeure clause expressly prevented cancellation of the lease 
for violation of a lease term caused by compliance with a state law or regulation. The 
Court cited Bibler Bros. Timber Corp. v. Tojac Minerals 102 in holding that forced 
pooling was not an exercise of the lease’s pooling provision but was compulsory and not 
voluntary.
Under Gordon, it can be argued that no lease containing a similar force majeure 
provision should be cancelled for violation of the pooling provision when a governmental
101 Gordon v. Crown Central Petroleum Company, 679 S.W. 2d 192 (Ark. 1984).
102 Bibler Bros. Timber Corp. v. Tojac Minerals, 664 S.W. 2d 472 (Ark. 1984).
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rule or order is involved, regardless of who requests the unit because size of the unit and 
who has right to operate are established by the Commission.
Arkansas might go further based on the holdings in Gordon v. Crown Central 
Petroleum, Tojac and Perry relating to its statutes. An interesting and persuasive 
argument can be made that based on the above cases (Arkansas, Mississippi and 
Oklahoma), any lease provision that conflicts with the statutes, rules and regulations of 
the pertinent regulatory agency will not be enforced against the bottom lessee.
To the extent possible from reading the preceeding cases and statutes a number 
of generalizations can be drawn. Generalizations are always dangerous from a legal 
perspective because cases turn on facts and law not generalizations. However with that 
caveat one can generalize that the courts will tend to favor bottom lessees when they 
have tried to develop the lands in question in accord with pertinent lease provisions 
and/or regulatory agency statutes, rules and regulations. Whether courts have viewed 
the top lessees’ or lessors’ conduct in these cases as claim jumping is not discernible. 
However, except for the Envirogas decision, the courts have not looked with favor upon 
the lessor’s or top lessees’ arguments. It is important to note that the top lessee’s rights 
are always subject to the rights of the bottom lessee as set out in the latter’s lease. Thus, 
if the bottom lease contains an express provision allowing pooling, and the lands are in 
fact pooled prior to the expiration of the bottom lease, the top lease will not be able to 
take effect. This result would be the same if the original lease contained provisions for 
extension or renewal and such an extension was exercised prior to the expiration of the
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primary term. When the original lease contains no provision giving the bottom lessee 
a right to obtain an extension, an extension obtained after the execution and recording 
of a top lease will be subject to the rights of the top lessee. 103 The bottom lessee 
might also want to include a right of first refusal in his lease to give him the option of 
matching a prospective top lessee’s offer.
2. OPERATIONS A ND/O R PRODUCTION
Operations and/or production are obvious ways that a bottom lessee has of 
extending his lease. This extension is made possible by complying with the terms of the 
lease through its habendum clause. Temporary cessation of production will not 
terminate a lease held under production 104 and most lease forms specify the number 
of days allowed in which to resume. The issues of extending the lease by production, 
shutting in a well or otherwise, were discussed in detail in an excellent presentation and 
paper by Mr. Thomas A. Daily, Esq. before the 1991 Arkansas Natural Resources Law 
Institute. 105 This paper will not attempt to address the same matters but will briefly 
address their application to top leases.
In the Arkansas case of Perry v. Nicor Exploration, the top lessee sued to cancel 
leases for lack of production in paying quantities during the secondary term. The top 
lessee argued that in making the determination as to whether the wells were producing
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103 Rorex v. Karcher, 224 P. 696 (Okla. 1923), rehearing denied (1924).
104 Saulsberry, 252 S.W. 2d at 836.
Daily, And For So Long Thereafter... "Paying Quantities", "Shutting-In! "And Other Legal 
Problems O f The Secondary Term, Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute (1991).
in paying quantities the leases should be examined individually. The Court, in its opinion 
noted that all the leases in question contained a pooling clause that allowed the acreage 
to be pooled to form a unit. It went on to further state that the purpose of pooling is 
to get production from the whole area. Because of pooling, paying production was 
calculated on a unit basis and thus each individual lessee’s performance was not an issue. 
Cancellation was therefore denied.
In discussing the holding of this case, this author recommends that you read the 
comments to the case contained in the Oil and Gas Reporter which critically question the 
Court’s rationale and its holding. The commentator contends that the unit basis was 
contrary to the policy underlying the Garcia v. King standard. He further stated that this 
holding does nothing to redress the problem created by low "fixed price" gas purchase 
contracts. The commentator continued by stating that the Court’s rationale is not 
compelling because pooling is unrelated to the marketing of gas. The result of this case 
would be to "limit lease cancellation for lack of production in paying quantities to 
unprofitable leases situated in unprofitable units." 106
A Law Journal Article entitled "Perry v. Nicor Exploration. Inc. Split Stream Sales 
and Paying Quantities" likewise criticizes the Perry v. Nicor decision for some of the 
same reasons stated above but adds additional "equitable" reasons. The criticisms above, 
while understandable, do not represent the Court’s opinion nor those of this writer. In 
addition to the reasons stated by the Court in Perry v. Nicor there are additional reasons 
(equitable) which may have been a factor in the decision which were not discussed. One
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106 97 Oil and Gas Reporter, 499.
interesting observation about the decision is that the top lessee, who took none of the 
risks of drilling, would receive a windfall simply because he could spot a perceived legal 
question and take advantage of the situation. One might ask if the constitutional 
precepts of Superior Oil Co. v. Beery would apply to Perry if the bottom lessee was not 
in a position to protect itself because the Oil and Gas Commission had decided who 
would be the operator of the well. 107
In the Saulsberry v. Siegel case a top lessee sought to cancel a bottom lease 
executed in 1922 on the grounds of cessation of production. The well in question was 
shut down for a period of four years after the derrick was destroyed by fire. The Court 
found that since the derrick was rebuilt and production continued, and the lessors did not 
complain for twenty-one years, cessation was temporary. In its ruling, the Court 
sustained the 1922 lease and cancelled the 1951 lease. Even where a portion of the land 
subject to an "unless" lease is assigned to a third party, a producing well brought in by 
the original lessee on his retained portion of land, if within the primary term, will extend 
the entire lease. 108 This is of course now subject to Arkansas’ statutory pugh 
clause. 109
Where the lease requires reworking operations within so many days, additional 
drilling or resumption of production may not be necessary within that time. In Jardell
107 Note, Perry v. Nicor Exploration, Inc.: Split Stream Sales and Paying Quantities, 42 Ark L. Rev. 
155 (1989).
108 See note 102; Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 188 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1951).
109 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 15-73-201 (1983).
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v. Hillin Oil Co., 110 repairs, site clean up, and pressure tubing testing constituted 
sufficient reworking operations within the meaning of the lease in light of the problems 
involved in obtaining approval from the working interest owners in a unit.
It is apparent that operations, production and pooling, whether voluntary or 
compulsory, have an effect on the top lease situation. It should be remembered that 
generally the terms of the bottom lease will control the effect of operations and/or 
production and whether they extend the bottom lease. The question of the effect of 
pooling on top leases, while generally favorable to bottom lessees, is somewhat difficult 
to categorize and has not been decided with certainty in Arkansas. Careful attention to 
the form of the lease and the terms contained therein by both the bottom lessee and 
potential top lessees is encouraged and recommended. A more explicit pooling provision 
and/or force majeure provision would help to clarify the situation as to pooling.
D. MISCELLANEOUS
Another matter of concern is that of anti-washout clauses. An anti-washout or 
extension and renewal clause is a provision which prevents the assignor of an overriding 
royalty interest, or an assignee who takes subject to a reserved overriding royalty interest, 
from acquiring a new lease and wiping out the previously assigned or reserved overriding 
royalty. The clause will typically state that the overriding royalty interest will burden any 
extension, renewal, or new lease on the same lands executed within a stated time period. 
When a bottom lessee and his assignees are bound by an anti-washout clause, will they
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110 Jardell v. Hillin Oil Co., 485 So. 2d 919 (La. 1986), rehearing denied (1986).
bind a subsequent top lessee? This question was addressed in Avatar v. Chevron. 111
Avatar leased from the mineral owners and assigned overriding royalty interests 
to two individuals, Moyers and Jenkins. The overriding royalty assignments contained 
anti-washout clauses. Avatar then assigned all of its right, title, and interest in the lease 
to Gulf. This assignment was made "subject to the terms and provisions contained in" 
the assignment of overriding royalty interests to Moyers and Jenkins. The mineral 
owners subsequently entered into a top lease with Murexco in the last month of the 
Avatar lease’s primary term, at which time no operations had begun. Gulf agreed with 
Murexco to let the Avatar lease expire so that the Murexco lease would become 
effective. When the Avatar lease expired, Murexco assigned its lease to Gulf. Moyers 
and Jenkins claimed that the Murexco lease, now held by Gulf, was subject to their 
overriding royalty interests, under two theories. The first alleged that Gulf had a duty, 
under the terms of the assignment from Avatar to Gulf, to reassign the lease to Avatar 
before it expired. Moyers and Jenkins claimed to be third party beneficiaries of this 
clause in the assignment. However, the Court held that Gulf never became obligated to 
reassign the lease, and thus it was irrelevant whether the overriding royalty interest 
owners were third party beneficiaries.
The stronger claim of the overriding royalty interest owners was that since the 
assignment from Avatar to Gulf was "subject to the terms and provisions contained in"
111 Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A ., Inc 1990 WL 58135 (E.D. La. 1990), aff'd, 933 
F. 2d 314 (5th Cir. 1991).
54
the assignment of overriding royalty, Gulf became subject to the anti-washout provision 
in the assignment of overriding royalty. Since the Murexco lease was in effect an 
extension or renewal of the Avatar lease, Moyers and Jenkins argued that the Murexco 
lease was subject to their overriding royalties. The Court rejected this argument by 
holding that the "subject to" language in the Avatar/Gulf assignment did nothing more 
than put Gulf on notice of an existing lease burden. Thus, if the Avatar/Gulf assignment 
had been clearer as to the applicability of the anti-washout provision to extensions or 
renewals acquired by Gulf, it is conceivable that the provision would have been applied 
with regard to the top lease.
Avatar is analogous to a two-party top lease situation because Gulf acquired the 
Murexco top lease. Anti-washout problems typically arise where the bottom lessee 
assigns his lease, reserving an overriding royalty interest, and the assignee acquires a top 
lease from the mineral owner and allows the bottom lease to expire. If the anti-washout 
provision is contained in the assignment (rather than in a separate conveyance of 
overriding royalty as in Avatar) there should be a stronger argument that the provision 
is applicable to a top lease. Under a theory of constructive trust, a top lease acquired 
by the assignee may be held subject to overriding royalties which burdened the bottom 
lease, even if the assignment which contained the reservation of overriding royalty did 
not contain an anti-washout provision. However, there generally must be some form of
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confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and assignee in order for this 
theory to apply. 112
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed, problem areas of top leases include the potential for novation or 
substituted contract, cloud on title, equitable obstruction, contractual interference, 
intentional breach of contract, slander of title, trespass, and violations of the rule against 
perpetuities. Furthermore, the actions of pooling, production, or other operations may 
well have an effect upon top lease arrangements.
In order to avoid problems and potential litigation the prudent purchaser will take 
certain precautions in drafting a top lease. In addition to those set out earlier in this 
paper, the following suggestions to consider were gathered from the referenced articles 
by J. Clayton Johnson113 and J. Hovey Kemp114.
(1) The top lease must be made "subject to" any right which may exist in the 
current lessee to avoid obstruction of the present lessee’s title.
(2) The habendum clause should contain a term of years to begin the day after 
the bottom lease is to expire.
112
Johnson, The Top Lease - No Longer a Stranger in the Lease Block, Thirty-Fourth Annual 
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 201, 218-223 (1983).
113 Id. at 227-28.
114
Kemp, supra note 1, at 660-62.
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(3) The top lease should contain a provision that makes it effective immedi­
ately (although the primary term will not begin until some point in the 
future).
(4) The top lease should be recorded as soon as possible.
(5) Upon acquiring the lease, a portion of the bonus must be paid to the 
mineral owner. There are numerous ways to structure the remaining 
consideration upon termination of the bottom lease.
(6) A  top lessee in Louisiana should be aware that the term of his top lease 
may be limited, by statute, to ten years from the date that the top lease is 
entered into. Additionally, he should be sure that there is language 
included that makes the top lease applicable to mineral rights that the 
lessor may obtain in the future.
(7) If a present lessee decides to top-lease his own current lease, the document 
needs to be specific as to whether the new lease is subject to the present 
lease and any rights of the lessee to maintain the present lease. In other 
words, whether or not a novation is intended should be specified.
(8) If a lessee assigns his interest to a sublessee, reserving an overriding 
royalty, the assignment should contain language which makes it applicable 
to extensions, renewals, and any new leases, in order to avoid a top lease 
"washout".
In summary, as the top lessee, it is important to make sure that the top lease is 
made subject to the bottom lease. Also, there must be a provision in the top lease that
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causes it to vest immediately. From the bottom lessee’s point of view, it is of paramount 
importance to either draft against the possibility of a top lease, or at least put other 
parties on notice of the bottom lease. Always keep alert for problems.
More fundamentally, documents for either party must be certain, clear, and 
specific in expressing the intent of the parties. If the documents are drafted with clarity 
and specificity, the top lease can be an effective tool in the oil and gas industry. A  good 
landman with good land owner contacts can prevent possible litigation.
W. ERIC WEST
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